to this day (Tuomi 1999) . However, after the middle ages, information also began to refer to communication. Peters (1988) suggests that was due in part to Descartes' interposition of ideas between nature and intellect. Rather than direct (or objective) perception of external real things in the world impressing the mind and informing, ideas insolated the mind from the world, and as a result no direct perception of one true reality was possible. What was left was the perspective that ideas or models and the information they produced were communicated between minds.
Later, during the industrial age, the opportunity to create communication networks rewarded objectively measured information. An information concept was needed that would be more suitable for the engineering of communication networks, a view that could measure information. Shannon's definition of information as the measurable reduction in uncertainty gained prominence. This definition was completely independent of the meaning of the communication, independent of its meaning to the receiver. This quantitative view of information led to advances in the natural sciences because this view was a perfect fit with philosophical assumptions of natural science. This quantitative viewpoint was rapidly applied to entropy in physics, to genetics in biology (Capurro 2003) , and in a number of mathematical and logic disciplines. For example, information turned out to be the missing factor in Maxwell's demon, a fictional character seemingly capable of decreasing entropy without expending energy. Popper (1959) linked information to logical probability by asserting that hypotheses that are more improbable, if true, are more informative (Newman 2001) . For the first time, information could exist outside the mind, enabling research in knowledge management systems and in organisms and organizations that could exchange information with their environments. This approach to information is an example of the syntax view.
At this time, some called this objective-engineering-communication perspective the American School. In contrast, the British School influenced by Donald MacKay, advocated a perspective on information that emphasized the older concept of information as constructive impression, as connotation, and as a medium for meaning. This British School view suggested that meaning is internal to an observer. MacKay and others within this semantic perspective proposed definitions of information as distinctions that make a difference (Bateson 1973; MacKay 1969) . When information is received, it causes a change in the representation that is used to depict what is known and how individuals can respond, given appropriate circumstances. Communication leads to knowledge by allowing individuals to replicate the representations of others (MacKay 1969) . In this modern semantic perspective, information-as-meaning changes the state of a representation.
The other leading modern view of information emerged with the advent of the computing machine. Information processing theory developed in the 1970s in the domains of cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. In information processing theory, information is an objective token that is manipulated in ways common to both men and machines. As a result of the pioneering work of Newell and Simon (Newman 2001), it became common to think of information as a part of a mechanistic process used in computing machines. This approach to information is labeled the token view in the taxonomy presented in this paper.
More recently, an age-old ontology has entered the information debate as well. Variously labeled subjectivism, nominalism, or anti-positivism, this ontology denies the existence of an objective reality, and hence assumes that information is created by the informed. This train of thought has led to information-related theories of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980), second-order cybernetics (von Foerster 1984) , and cybersemiotics (Brier 2005), a set of theories included within the adaptation view.
While differences abound, several important aspects of information are common to many of the definitions. For example, most theories propose that information is related to knowledge, reduces uncertainty, is related to unexpectedness, is based on differences in data, is understood by a system that changes its internal organization, and is escorted by well formed symbols (Hofkirchner 1999). In addition, most definitions are consistent with several intuitive ideas about information (Floridi 2005) . First, information is additive-two pieces of information are generally more informative than either by itself. Information is nonnegative; if information is informative, the receiver or interpreter always knows more, never less. Information is also irreversible; once sent or perceived, information cannot be undone. Further, information is also context dependent; some news is more informative in some contexts than others (Gernert 1996) . Finally, information implies a sign. For example, a sign of glowing red informs that the stove top is hot.
Most theories view information as something more than data. Some theories make a distinction between data and information by stating that data are raw facts and information is processed data that reveals meaning or is in meaningful form. Data, from the Greek diaphora for difference, are facts regarding some differences or, more simply, a lack of uniformity (Floridi 2005) . Most theories of information agree that information depends on data being well formed. Well formed data are at the same time the resources and constraints that make information possible. In this sense, information comes from data as shelter from bricks (Floridi 2005) . Shelter, while it consists of bricks, is not the bricks. Shelter is constrained by the bricks, it may be thought of as a particular presentation of bricks, like information is a particular (re)presentation of data.
This historical review suggests that as philosophical outlooks have changed, information has changed (Volz 1996) . Currently, philosophy has no universal theory of the structure of the world; therefore, a universal theory of information should not be expected (Horz 1996) . Absent a unifying view of philosophy, present day scientific domains make a variety of assumptions about ontology and epistemology that lead to multiple perspectives on information. For example, in various domains information is order (De Vree 1996), a sign (Stamper 1985) , a truth condition (Israel and Perry 1990), a property of the universe, on objective commodity intrinsic to objects (Dretske 1981; Stonier 1996) , or simply the combination of a sign, a thing, and a person (Borgmann 1999) . This surfeit of definitions, and the lack of a unifying philosophical outlook, has produced a preparadigmatic state of flux. 
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